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DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY: DOES
ABSTENTION MAKE THE HEART GROW FONDER?*
MS. ALLEVA:I I come to this conference, and particularly to this
distinguished panel, with great humility as a new student of Indian law.
Obvious, I think, to both old and newcomers to the area is that the study
of abstention, like a treasure chest key, unlocks a rich collection of
questions concerning political autonomy, sovereign prerogative, and
cultural identity. In particular, the exploration of when, why, and how
the federal courts will or will not defer to tribal court civil adjudications
ultimately leads to fundamental issues of power, trust, mutual respect,
and self-respect, both at an institutional and individual level.
The United States Supreme Court's exhaustion doctrine-announced in the National Farmers Union 2 and Iowa Mutua 3 cases -spotlights what one author has called "[t]he uneasy fit between tribal and
federal courts." 4 What some may see in those opinions as the Supreme
Court's jurisdictional schizophrenia- that is, its simultaneous deference
to tribal court exhaustion and self-determination on the one hand, but its
preservation of federal court review or interference on the other-leaves
unresolved many questions about the reach and relationship of the
judicial systems within the federal union.
Why did the Supreme Court create a separate abstention/exhaustion
doctrine for certain tribal and federal court civil actions? What messages
does that doctrine send about the unique relationship between federal
and tribal governments? Does the doctrine debilitate or legitimate tribal
judicial authority? Is there another model that better accommodates the
sovereign prerogative of both the federal and tribal courts when, as Mr.
Deloria vividly put it yesterday, rights and relationships in one legal
system suddenly jump track and end up in another legal system?
Should the District Court or the Supreme Court provide the federal
review in these cases? What types of questions should be reviewed?
Should there be any review at all?
Yesterday's commentators again echo in our ears-has the Supreme
Court simply "lost its way" yet another time? Is there a need for
* The following are edited proceedings from the North Dakota Law Review Symposium
Conference. Held at the University of North Dakota April 21, 1995, this panel discussion is premised
on Lynn Slade's article entitled Dispute Resolution in Indian County: Harmonizing National Farmers
Union, Iowa Mutual, and the Abstention Doctrine in the Federal Courts, 71 N.D. L. REv. 519 (1995).
1. Patti Alleva, Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.
2. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
3. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
4. Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the Federal
Judicial System, 78 MImN. L. REv. 259,306 (1993).
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Congress to take the current situation in hand and legislate a more
comprehensive framework for cross-jurisdictional dialogues? I suspect
our eminent panelists will have much to say about these and related
issues. I am honored to bring them to you. To open with the main
presentation is Lynn Slade from the Modrall, Sperling firm in New
Mexico. Following Lynn with commentary, first, is Professor Laurie
Reynolds, who is the Director of the Office of Graduate and International Legal Studies at the University of Illinois College of Law, where she
teaches Native American law, property, and land use planning. Welcome
to the confernce, Laurie. The remaining faces and voices are very
familiar to us. They are: Professor Alex Skibine from the University of
Utah College of Law; Phil Lear from the Salt Lake City firm of Snell &
Wilmer; Professor Robert Clinton from the University of Iowa College of
Law; and Professor Frank Pommersheim from the University of South
Dakota School of Law.
PRESENTATION By LYNN SLADE

Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Harmonizing National
Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual, and the Abstention Doctrine in
the Federal Courts
MS. REYNOLDS: Like Mr. Slade and some of the other panelists
I, too, am critical of the Supreme Court's tribal exhaustion doctrine. I
think, however, that the sources of my criticisms differ significantly from
most of the other commenters here. In these comments, I would like to
articulate my uneasiness with the doctrine and suggest ways in which I
think we might better protect meaningful federal, tribal, and state
interests here. And I want to emphasize that I offer these remarks with a
well-deserved sense of modesty. I do not presume to have answers. I
merely want to make a few tentative suggestions and try to engage you
in some of these very difficult legal issues.
I've identified three main weaknesses in the exhaustion doctrine.
The first is that the doctrine itself is extremely unclear, and has produced
wide-ranging inconsistencies. Litigants can never know when they go
into federal court if the Court is going to order exhaustion or not. On
the one end of the spectrum you have courts who apply the exhaustion
doctrine in a very, very broad manner, as Mr. Slade described. Several
courts, in fact, adopt a standard that will require exhaustion irrespective
of the wishes of the parties, whether a suit is pending or not in tribal
court, so long as the assertion of tribal jurisdiction would be "colorable" or "plausible." At the other end of the spectrum, we have courts
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that take a very narrow view of the tribal exhaustion doctrine. They will
order it only when a tribal suit is pending or only when the federal court
has concluded that the case involves "internal tribal affairs." In fact,
one Court refused to order exhaustion when it concluded that the tribal
court itself lacked jurisdiction over the case, which is, of course, what the
National Farmers Court sent the case back to tribal court to do. In some
courts I sense a certain reluctance in their application of the tribal
exhaustion doctrine. In fact, they seem to place tribal courts on a very
short leash, ordering exhaustion but reminding the parties that they will
only consent to refrain from exercising their jurisdiction over the case so
long as the tribal court basically conforms to the federal court's view of
what proper judicial procedures ought to be. I think this inconsistency
among the lower courts comes not only from the imprecision of the
language of the Supreme Court opinions in National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual themselves, but also my sense is that it comes from varying views
among the federal courts as to what they would define probably as the
competency or the reliability of the tribal courts. And one thing that I
think is generally the case, although there are certainly exceptions, for
many lower courts, the more freely they order exhaustion, the more they
emphasize the availability of post-exhaustion review back in the federal
court system itself.
And that brings me to my second very general criticism of the
exhaustion doctrine-it is not at all clear what's going to happen after
exhaustion has taken place. The two Supreme Court cases themselves, I
think, suggest slightly different results. National Farmers Union
expressly refers to post-exhaustion review of the merits of the tribal
court decision in the federal courts. Iowa Mutual seems to suggest a
more preclusive effect of the tribal court decision. I think probably the
Supreme Court just hopes that the issue will go away, but undoubtedly
this issue will work its way up to the Supreme Court again. The Ninth
Circuit is the one court that has articulated a post-exhaustion standard of
review involving one standard, a clearly erroneous standard, for factual
matters and a de novo review for federal law. Now, whether that is
ultimately the standard that gains widespread acceptance or not, I think it
is clear that the lower courts very vigorously rely on the availability of
post-exhaustion review of tribal court decisions. In fact, some of the
lower courts refer to the exhaustion doctrine as giving the the tribal court
a "first crack" at the matter, clearly suggesting that the second crack is
going to be available somewhere else. The one thing that's not clear,
though, as a concurring judge in a recent Eighth Circuit opinion
indicated, is where the federal jurisdiction is going to come from. There
is no federal statute that gives federal district courts jurisdiction to review
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or hear appeals from tribal court decisions. So I think there's some
jurisdictional problem in the post-exhaustion review as well, although I
recognize that most of the federal courts that have dealt with this matter
anticipate, as I say, a fairly active post-exhaustion review.
The third and major flaw that I see in the exhaustion doctrine, and I
know this is where I part ways with Mr. Slade, is that I think it is based on
a stunningly broad definition of federal question jurisdiction. In many
ways the exhaustion doctrine is necessary only because the Supreme
Court so broadly defined federal question jurisdiction to include really
any issue going to the scope of the tribal court's adjudicatory jurisdiction. Although the Ninth Circuit's panel opinion in the National
Farmers Union case was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court, I
believe that the Ninth Circuit panel really got it right when they chose to
dismiss the case of National Farmers Union by concluding that matters
of tribal adjudicatory power just simply do not state a federal question.
The Ninth Circuit made a distinction, which the Supreme Court has yet
to embrace, although it has recognized the distinction in several contexts.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion distinguished between tribal legislative or
regulatory jurisdiction on the one hand, (the coercive power of a
sovereign to actually regulate and direct the conduct of people within the
scope of its governmental authority), and on the other hand these
questions about the adjudicatory authority of the tribal court to hear or
resolve a particular dispute. And as the Ninth Circuit panel noted, those
two elements are frequently not coterminous; it is very often the case that
a forum will decide or resolve a dispute that it has no power to regulate.
For that reason, the Ninth Circuit thought that the better way to slice the
pie was to say that, on the one hand, these latter issues that are limited to
a determination of the scope of the tribal court's adjudicatory jurisdiction simply do not raise a federal question.
Now, I'd like to offer a few reasons why I think that that's a good
idea. First of all, I think that this broad definition of federal question
jurisdiction really creates a jurisdictional boot strap. It gets the federal
courts involved when previously there had been no federal court
jurisdiction. In fact, prior to the exhaustion rule many federal courts
routinely dismissed lawsuits involving on-reservation contracts, leases,
personal injury disputes, by concluding simply that there was no federal
interest at stake here. It was not a federal question. All of these cases
now, in light of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, can be recast
as a federal question jurisdictional dispute. And I'm reminded of Mr.
Deloria's words this morning when he referred to something like a
"tug-of-war over jurisdiction for the sake of jurisdiction." It seems to
me that in a large respect that's exactly what this federal question
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exhaustion of tribal remedies dispute is, because it inserts an unnecessary
layer of federal involvement in what is in many cases merely a dispute
between tribal and state courts over who should exercise jurisdiction.
That is, we now have a federal overlay to the Williams v. Lee 5 type of
dispute. And I think, in addition, that removing the scope of tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction from our definition of federal question will
remove an imbalance that automatically favors tribal court over state
court resolution of issues even though in many of these cases I think we
would probably agree that no exclusive tribal court jurisdiction exists.
Most importantly, I find that the exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine
creates a stark anomaly. It is simply incongruous to hold that, although
tribal governments are sovereigns with inherent sovereignty, free from
constitutional limitations, nevertheless, every aspect of their adjudicatory
jurisdiction creates a federal question that's to be resolved by the federal
courts.
Now, as I said, although the Supreme Court has refused to make that
distinction between adjudicatory and legislative jurisdiction and instead
chose to treat all jurisdiction alike, its actual holdings before and after
National Farmers Union suggest that the Court does indeed recognize
the difference between adjudicatory jurisdiction and regulatory or
legislative jurisdiction. Kerr McGee,6 Brendale,7 South Dakota v.
Bourland,8 these are all cases in. which the Supreme Court directly
confronted the claim of an individual as to the legitimacy of tribal
sovereign power. And in none of those cases did the Court suggest that
exhaustion to a tribal court would be appropriate, even though in all of
those cases the issue being litigated fit well within the National Farmers
Union Court's broad definition of jurisdiction. Thus, the dilemma for
the lower courts is to try to figure out whether to do what the Supreme
Court says, which is to order exhaustion in a very broad range of cases,
(that is, any time "jurisdiction" is involved) or whether to do what the
Supreme Court actually does, which is to retain federal question
jurisdiction over cases involving tribal regulatory or legislative
jurisdiction. I believe that what Supreme Court actually does is a more
satisfactory resolution. In my opinion, the courts should retain federal
question jurisdiction in cases of tribal regulatory authority. As a result,
both the tribal and the federal courts would have concurrent jurisdiction.
And at that point I would hop right back on Mr. Slade's train and say
5.
6.
7.
(1989).
8.

Williams v. Lee Optical Co., 358 U.S. 483 (1954).
Kerr McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
Brendale v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
113 S.Ct. 2309 (1993).
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that the doctrines of Colorado River 9 and YoungerlO abstention are
perfectly well-suited to decide the allocation of jurisdiction over these
questions.
As one last observation, I realize that whenever there is a proposal to
restrict federal court review of tribal decisions, U.S. lawyers instinctively
react to that, it can't be, there can't be a body of law out there that
involves federal questions that a federal court can't get its hands on.
Various proposals have been advanced -including a specialized federal
court of appeals, review by writ of certiorari, or even original federal
district court jurisdiction. For me personally, certiorari review strikes the
best balance between, on the one hand, the perceived need for federal
court review of.tribal court rulings of federal law and, on the other hand,
the interests in preserving tribal sovereignty. It may not be a perfect
solution, but in my view it is far preferable to the current federal court
micro management of tribal court decisionmaking, which is exactly what
is contemplated by the tribal exhaustion doctrine.
MR. SKIBINE: Thank you. Let me just make a couple of
comments on the two previous presentations and why I am suspicious
about the idea of invoking the federal abstention doctrine. Last year, I
published an article in the New Mexico Law Review titled "Deference
Owed Tribal Court Jurisdictional Determinations: Towards Coexistence,
Understanding, and Respect Between Different Cultural and Judicial
Norms." Although half of the article deals with exhaustion of tribal
court remedies, the main thrust of the article was to present an argument
for greater deference to tribal courts' jurisdictional determinations when
those determinations are reviewed by federal courts after the tribal court
remedies have been exhausted. In order to make the case for greater
deference, I proposed an analogy to the administrative law doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of judicial
deference towards findings of administrative agencies. I was not
advocating that, doctrinally speaking, tribal courts are the same as
administrative agencies. They are not. I only proposed a convenient
analogy because the policies behind the exhaustion doctrine in
administrative law is the same or very similar to the policy behind the
exhaustion of tribal remedies doctrine as advanced in National
Farmersl"and Iowa Mutual.12
Thus in administrative law, we speak of a policy of preserving the
autonomy and integrity of the agencies. We also speak in terms of
9. Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
10. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
11. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
12. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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promoting judicial economy by avoiding piecemeal litigation, and
allowing the agency to bring its expertise to bear on the particular
problems. Similarly, National Farmers and Iowa Mutual spoke in terms
of promoting tribal self-government by preserving the tribal courts'
authority over reservation affairs and allowing the tribal courts the first
shot at determining their jurisdiction.
It is important to realize that when we are looking at exhaustion of
tribal remedies and are trying to compare it- to some other legal
doctrines, whether it be administrative law, international law, or federal
abstention, nothing doctrinally speaking mandates that we adopt one
doctrine and reject all others. So the question is: which analogy fits
better. The problem in using the' federal abstention doctrine is that it
fails to take into account the nature of the federal question which
created federal jurisdiction under National Farmers, which is: Does the
tribe have jurisdiction?
The Supreme Court test to determine the existence of tribal
jurisdiction under Montana13 will in many cases depend on whether
tribal jurisdiction is necessary or vital to tribal self-government. It is
because the answer to this question is really more political than legal that
it is appropriate for the tribal courts to answer the question first. In
effect the answer to these questions depend more on applying the law to
the facts than on deciding pure questions of law. This is why there
should not only be exhaustion of tribal remedies but why there should
also be a certain amount of deference given to those tribal determinations.
The nature of these inquiries is much different than the nature of
the inquiry in a Younger' 4 or Colorado Riverl5 abstention type case.
Abstention in federal/state abstention jurisprudence has to do with
federalism and the nature of the bargain struck between the states in the
Constitution when they agreed to the federal union. The tribes were not
part of that contract. As Richard Monette stated this morning, perhaps
the tribes should have been part of the bargain and should be brought
into the Union on a model similar to that of the states. The fact is, as of
now they are still not states because they are not part of the constitutional
contract. Therefore notions of federalism are not applicable to the
federal-tribal relationship as they are to the federal/state relationship.
I also believe that we cannot compare the tribal exhaustion doctrine
with the federal/state abstention doctrine unless we talk about notions of

13. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
14. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
15. Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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res judicata and collateral estoppel. These two doctrines prevent a
federal court from relitigating issues decided by state courts unless we
are dealing with a Pullman type abstention. Unless we are willing to
apply these two doctrines as well as others governing federal/state
relations such as "full faith and credit" to judgments of tribal courts, we
should not be speaking in terms of federal/state abstention when we are
talking about the tribal exhaustion doctrine.
Finally, I must confess that I really do not follow Mr. Slade's
distinction when he says that he sees National Farmersas a Younger case
and Iowa Mutual as a Colorado River case. An analogy with Younger
will result in an enormous amount of federal abstention while if a
majority of the tribal cases fall under the Colorado River model, there
will be almost no abstention. I believe that the tribal cases fit in neither
category for the following reasons.
Younger abstention is appropriate when a party who is being
prosecuted under state law is alleging that the state's action is unconstitutional. Even though Younger was extended to civil causes of action in
Penzoil, you still have to allege an unconstitutional action. That is why
the Younger doctrine has also been termed "our federalism" doctrine.
"Our federalism" only refers to the relationship between the federal
government and the states, not between the federal government and the
tribes. Justice Black has described the Younger doctrine in the following
terms:
It is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both state and national government. And in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interest, always
endeavors to do so in ways which will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the states.
Although I believe that applying the Younger doctrine would be
beneficial to tribal courts since it would result in a lot of abstention, I do
not believe that it is applicable to tribal cases, which means that as far as
Mr. Slade's abstention argument is concerned, we are only left with
Colorado River types of cases. I believe that comparing tribal cases with
Colorado River cases would be very detrimental to tribes because it
would result in almost no abstention. Colorado River abstension is only
called for when there are exceptional circumstances. These exceptional
circumstances are very hard to obtain. As Professor Reddish once
observed, even ColoradoRiver was not a Colorado River type of case.
Fortunately, Colorado River is not applicable to tribal cases either,
because in Colorado River, the Court was only concerned about judicial
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economy. In National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, however, the Court
was also concerned about promoting tribal self-government by
preserving the tribal court's authority over reservation affairs.
Finally, let me comment on the thesis just proposed by Professor
Reynolds. Before I finish, let me first state that both Ms. Reynolds' and
Mr. Slade's papers were extremely well written and researched and it was
a pleasure to read them. Every time that a paper challenges one to start
thinking about an issue in a different way, it has made a great contribution to the field, which both those papers have done.
The problem that I have with Professor Reynolds' paper is that it is
based on a finding that tribal legislative jurisdiction is not co-extensive
with and should therefore be treated differently than tribal adjudicatory
jurisdiction. While I could be persuaded that she is right, the fact
remains that in Iowa Mutual and National Farmers, the Court rejected
that position.
Having said that, on one hand I want to agree with her that questions
of adjudicatory jurisdiction should not be a federal question. Why is it
not a federal question? Because I believe that whenever a case arises on
the reservation, the tribe should always have jurisdiction. Therefore,
federal courts should not bother questioning the tribal court's jurisdiction. If there is federal court review, it should only be limited to finding
out if the case arose on the reservation. On the other hand, where the
war is really being fought is in determining the tribe's regulatory
jurisdiction and I do not want to concede the war by abdicating to Ms.
Reynolds' position that there should never be exhaustion when the issue
is the extent of the tribal legislative jurisdiction.
When dealing with tribal legislative jurisdiction, most of the time, the
issue will be decided under the Montana test. Under that test, the Court
held that the tribes retained their inherent sovereign powers as long as
they were necessary to tribal self-government. However, if the case
concerned non-members on non-members' fee lands, there is a
presumption that the tribe does not have jurisdiction. This presumption
can be rebutted, however, if the tribe can prove that the non-member
activity will have a direct impact on the political integrity, economy,
security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.
I, for one, do not want federal judges deciding this issue before they
have heard from the tribal judges. The reason I take this position is that
I do not believe that the test is either legal or legitimate. It is a political
test. Perhaps the Court knows that and also knows that there really
should not be any federal jurisdiction under National Farmers to start
with. So it struck a compromise. Although it decided to impose federal
question jurisdiction to review questions of tribal jurisdiction under the
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Montana test, it also mandated that federal judges first hear from the
Indians on what is, most of the time, a political issue. Thank you.
MR. LEAR: There's a saying in Germany where I lived for six
years that cheese should open and close the meal or open and close the
"stomach" as they say in literal translation. We have opened and closed
this symposium with discussion of exhaustion, or "abstention," if you
will-the cheese of this academic experience. But I am veritably
choking on the mandatory nature of the doctrine espoused. Neither
National Farmers Union1 6 nor Iowa Mutual 17 mandate exhaustion. It is
the circuit courts, not the United States Supreme Court, that mandate
exhaustion.
So you will find me, if you didn't yesterday, aligning myself with
Mr. Slade on this issue. I agree with Mr. Slade that we need direction
and that perhaps we have not received that direction from the judiciary.
However, I believe that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual give us more
direction than the circuit courts and the lower courts ascribe to them.
More to the point, I think the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits need a
remedial course in reading and comprehension, because I do not feel
that the theses we see in the circuit cases and the district court cases,
particularly in the Tenth Circuit where Mr. Slade and I practice, follow
from the conclusions drawn in Iowa Mutual.
However, I get to Mr. Slade's result in a different way. But before I
tell you that result; if you haven't guessed it already, I need to address
some comments made by the members of this and other panels. I agree
with Professor Laurence that a federal removal statute might be helpful.
As a practical matter, we've had two hundred years of federalism, and
Congress has shown little leadership in clarifying the relationship
between federal and tribal courts. I don't think we're going to get
much.- I was enamored of the removal statute concept yesterday when I
heard it. I don't think original thoughts. So I heard it for the first time
yesterday. And I wish Congress would provide us with a removal statute.
But as a practical matter, I don't think it's going to happen. And I, as a
practitioner, representing the natural resources developer on the
reservations, need to deal with the here and now, and I don't have a
removal statute.
With regard to Tim Joranko, who is not here-and we seem to bash
those who aren't here to defend themselves-and to a certain extent with
Professor Skibine I disagree with the notion that bright-line tests are
helpful in the concurrent jurisdiction setting. As much as I dislike
16. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 US. 845 (1985).
17. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 US. 9 (1987).
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Brendale,l8 I embrace what Justice Stevens said in his opinion, namely,
that bright lines are the province of the Court and not the judiciary. Yet
usurping that province is precisely what the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are
about, as the Eighth Circuit in the recent Duncan Energy' 9 case reminds
US.
With regard to Professor Skibine's administrative model, I need to
reject that one also. There is little doubt that our experience with
exhaustion comes from our body of federal and state administrative law.
Where parallels break down, however, is that in the agency arena it's the
agency who has drafted the regulation, it's the agency who has been
empowered by statute to regulate a certain province, a certain area of
endeavor, and it's the agency that has its own quasi-judicial system to
deal with the interpretation of its own laws. The statutory standard, of
review is whether the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The standard is not a de novo standard. And so I'm not comfortable
with the administrative law analogy.
Moving now to Sam Deloria, whom, I sense distinctly was my
antagonist yesterday, I disagree that a little affirmative action is a healthy
thing, until we get our sea legs. If I understood Mr. Deloria correctly,
that was precisely what he was advocating. Affirmative action in my
opinion is demeaning to an equal dignity doctrine of courts. Rather, I
subscribe to a Worcester v. Georgia interpretation of the legal relationship between Indian nations and federal governments-one of
sovereigns. In pure theory of Indian federal law, the concepts of
guardianship, trusteeship, and wardship are inconsistent. I understood
Professor Monette yesterday, and Professor Clinton today, to agree that
there is inconsistency and that they favor the Worcester v. Georgia
analysis, as I do. Unfortunately, we have to live with the inconsistency.
So, I would say that affirmative action is not a good thing in that context.
Also, I disagree with Sam Deloria's statement yesterday that it's all right
to force a nonfederal tribal litigant into tribal court. After all, he
postulated, they need the experience. It's okay if we force a few of these
non-Indian natural resources developers into the tribal system, he
continued, where we may have nonlegally trained judges. It's all right
because we have the parallel in our federalist system where we have fifty
thousand non-legally trained judges. He was referring to justices of the
peace. I don't buy that because the justices of the peace are not
adjudicating the weightier matters we deal with when we approach
18. Brendale v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
19. Duncan Energy Co., Inc. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d
1249 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 779 (1995).
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federal questions; those justices of the peace are not dealing with arcane
or esoteric doctrines, by and large, that one finds in our own federal or
state system. I'm spending all my time challenging the others.
I do agree with Professor Clinton, again getting back to Worcester v.
Georgia. If one accepts the Worcester v. Georgia relationship, legal
relationship, of Indian tribe to federal government as sovereign to
sovereign-and I do-then I think the model that really works is not
abstention, is not administrative law, is not a bright-line test, but is comity
under international law. If one, on the other hand, accepts the Cherokee
Nation postulates from which we infer a trust relationship-and I'm not
in any way challenging the fact that we don't believe there is a trust
relationship, but I think our practice is broken down under the weight of
the theory-then I think you get to abstention. So I arrive at the same
place as Mr. Slade. But I get there in a different way.
And let me now give you the thesis that you read in our paper, in
the Lear/Miller paper, and that is, why principles of international law
really ought to be applied and why they would dignify the tribal courts
as opposed to demean them by being applied. The factors in an
international choice of law comity context are these: First, what is the
link of activity to the sovereigns; that is, the activity that gave rise to the
case in controversy? Second, what is the link between the parties and
that sovereign? Third, what is the importance of regulation to the
particular sovereign that is asked to take jurisdiction? Fourth, what are
the justified expectations of the parties? Now, Mr. Deloria suggested
yesterday that expectations of the parties shouldn't matter. Not from a
practitioner's point of view! And, after all, after we push it through the
theoretical sieve, it's those of us lawyers at the end of the line after it's
been pushed through the sieve that must deal with what we've pushed
through the sieve. My obligation to my client in a natural resources
context is to win. On this point Mr. Slade was very articulate yesterday.
It is moral and justifiable to seek to win. It's all right to seek the best for
your client. And if the best for your client is seeking remedies in one
forum over the other, either because you know how that particular judge
is going to respond to an issue or because of your familiarity with the
rules of that particular forum or the expectation and the remedy that
might result or in the findings of fact or in the maintenance of the
record or whatever you will-selecting the most advantageous forum is
precisely what we should be doing. Forum shopping is what we do every
day. It's fine. It's all right. It violates no moral code. And I submit to
you that the principles of international law get us there if you accept the
sovereign-to-sovereign concept of Worcester v. Georgia. Fifth, to what
extent does the other sovereign have an interest in regulating the
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activity? Sixth, what is the likelihood of conflict with the regulation of
another state?
Now, many of those points line up point to point with the Colorado
River doctrine.
So in conclusion I say, if you accept the
sovereign-to-sovereign as the accurate characterization of the legal
relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government, then
international law principles should apply. If you go the other route and
fully embrace the dependent-sovereign notion that the tribal courts are
really a subset of the federal system and we're within the embrace of the
federal system, then I would advocate the Colorado River abstention
doctrine. Thank you.
MR. CLINTON: I again want to thank the North Dakota Law
School and its fine law review staff for inviting me here. It has been a
marvelous time and I want to thank all the participants for their
wonderful words. It has really been one of the great conferences in
which I've had the privilege to participate.
The issue of the National Farmers Union abstention doctrine is
widely debated and widely misunderstood. In a marvelous article
Professor Laurie Reynolds indicates that there has been wide disparity of
views and scholarly criticism about the abstention doctrine, with some
writers, including some on this panel, applauding the doctrine and some
others, including myself, criticizing the doctrine. She marvels at why this
wide diversity of response. By the way, while Professor Reynolds is too
modest, I think, to give you the citation to her article, please let me give it
to you. 20 The reason why I think there's a lot of misunderstanding
about the National Farmers Union abstention doctrine and the
divergence of scholarly approach to the question is that the National
Farmers Union opinion really addresses two different issues, creating two
different doctrines. Some people are applauding one part, while other
people are criticizing another part.
What is involved in National Farmers Union21 and in Iowa
Mutual?22 These cases basically make two different points. One point
involves the primacy of tribal courts in resolving issues. We can call this
point, the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine involves giving
tribal courts the first crack at decision-making on questions involving the
scope of their own jurisdiction. The exhaustion doctrine, however, does
not merely involve giving the tribal courts the first opportunity to
address such questions. There are other ways to describe it. The
20. Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While
ExpandingFederalJurisdiction,73 CAR. L. Ra'V. 1089 (1995).
21. National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
22. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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exhaustion doctrine is basically about tribal court primacy in resolving
cases that arise on tribal reservations. And, of course, Indian law
scholars looking at the exhaustion doctrine applaud this part of the
doctrine. I too applaud the exhaustion part of the doctrine. That is not
the part of National Farmer's Union that I have chosen to criticize.
What is the other half of the National Farmers Union doctrine?
The other half of the doctrine is the part of the opinion that holds
(basically out of whole cloth) that there is federal jurisdiction over the
National Farmers Union claim, even though the Court did not apply its
recently formulated Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical test 2 3 or any of the
other conventional tests of federal question jurisdiction to arrive at that
Unlike most recent, conventional federal question
conclusion.
jurisdiction cases, the Court did not imply a cause of action from any
regulatory statute or constitutional provision. Indeed, in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez,24 a case to which I intend to return later, the Court
indicated that it would not lightly imply federal causes of action in the
arena of Indian affairs, even in areas governed by federal statute, in part
to protect tribal sovereignty. Yet, in National Farmers Union, it turned
around and made one up out of whole cloth, without even the benefit of
a federal statutory or constitutional provision to which to anchor the
cause of action. Not only did the Court do that, it also indicated that
after the plaintiff had exhausted its tribal court remedies, there was still
federal jurisdiction over its claim of lack of tribal jurisdiction and it
could come back to the federal courts and relitigate that question anew.
Unlike my friend and colleague in the back of the room (Robert
Laurence) who indicated in an earlier panel that he sees the world
asymmetrically, I am part of what he describes as the full-court press
crowd on the question of full faith and credit. If you try to review a state
judgment that fully litigated that court's jurisdiction in a later federal
court proceeding filed after the state judgment became final, the federal
court will throw out your collateral attack based on the Full Faith and
Credit Act.25 The federal court will advise you that the question of the
state court's jurisdiction is res judicata. That result will occur even if the
state court decision on the jurisdictional question was patently in error. I
submit, and always have maintained, that tribal judgments are judgments
of the territories within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Act,
thereby indicating that they are entitled to the same full faith and credit
as state judgments. United States ex rel. Mackey v. Cox26 holds that
23.
24.
25.
26.

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
28 U.S.C. § 1738.
59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1856).
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tribal courts are courts of territories for a very similar statute and, from
this case and other indications of Congressional intent, I have argued that
tribal judgments are entitled to full faith and credit after they are final.
On this analysis, a federal court has no right to review the jurisdictional'
question after the tribal judgment becomes final. Congress created no
cause of action in that direction. Congress made no exception to the
Full Faith and Credit Act. The tribal judgment therefore should be
treated as fully final on all issues that were or could have been litigated,
including the question of tribal court jurisdiction. As a result, I have
criticized National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual on the ground that
there was absolutely no statutory authorization for federal court review
of the tribal court's decision on jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court
totally ignored the importance of the Full Faith and Credit Act to its
holding. 2 7 I should add, by the way, that I regard the full faith and
credit issue as still open because the Supreme Court failed to address or
resolve it in these two opinions. I therefore encourage any tribal
advocate to make exactly that argument when any National Farmers
Union-type case comes back to federal court for review after exhaustion
of tribal remedies.
I said earlier that I would return to the Martinez case. Martinez very
nicely makes precisely the point I have been stressing about National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual. In Martinez, the Court sustained the
primacy of tribal adjudication of Indian civil rights issues but did not
provide for any federal review when the tribal judgment became final.
The judgment of the tribal court was final on those issues. The tribal
court had both primary and final jurisdiction over the adjudication of
civil Indian Civil Rights Act claims. In fact, if you look at the facts of
National Farmers Union, the case just as easily could have been brought
as a Martinez-style case based on a claim of lack of due process in the
tribal court proceedings. Why was it not brought in that fashion?
Basically, the plaintiff structured the case as an attack on tribal
jurisdiction, rather than as a civil rights claim, because it had to create a
theory that would get the case into federal court. Martinez would have
precluded federal review of any civil rights claim. Consequently, what
the National Farmers Union decision seems to represent is a partial
abandonment of what originally was the correct approach of Martinez,
leaving the matter completely and finally to the tribal forums. It is this
abandonment of tribal court finality and the invented assertion of federal

27. E.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK, L. REV. 77, 150 (1993); Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and
the Federal Union, 26 WmL.mETTE L. REv. 841,879-80 (1990).
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supervisory authority over tribal court decisions of which I have been
highly critical.
I want to move to Mr. Slade's paper because, unlike Professor
Royster's paper on which I commented yesterday, there is much with
which I disagree in Mr. Slade's paper. I want to particularize my
disagreements with Mr. Slade's arguments. Before I do that, however, I
want to say right up front that I am very leery of drawing analogies to
the state abstention doctrines, as Mr. Slade's paper does. States are
constitutionally protected in this union. There is a Tenth Amendment
that protects the states. There is not one for the tribes. States are
structurally protected in this union. They have formal representation in
the Senate. While the Cherokee were once promised Congressional
representation 2S and the Delaware Nation also was promised representation, 2 9 I do not see their delegates sitting in the current Congress. And,
as a result, tribal sovereignty is far more fragile than state sovereignty in
this union. Like Justice Blackmun, I am prepared to defer to political
protections for states, as suggested in the Garcia case,3 0 but not for tribes
because of the lack of that constitutional and structural guarantees within
the federal union. So I am wary about such analogies and Mr. Slade's
paper is totally based on those analogies.
But, for purposes of argument, I want to concede to Mr. Slade the
legitimacy of drawing such analogies. Assuming the propriety of such
analogies, I want to offer what I think is an internal critique, rather than
an external critique, of the paper. The reason I put Mr. Slade's diagram
back on the screen is that you will notice that the basic core of Slade's
argument is that there are four, and only four, structured abstention
doctrines-Pullman abstention, 3l Burford abstention, 32 Younger abstention, 3 3 and Colorado River Water Conservation District abstention. 34
The basic problem I have with Mr. Slade's paper, which is very well
written, very clear and, to my way of thinking, very wrong, is that there
are not just four rigid abstention categories, as the paper suggests.
First, a very important category is ignored in the paper. Chief
Justice Marshall wrote in Cohens v. Virginia3 5 that "[i]t is most true that
this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true,
that it must take jurisdiction if it should." In short, a federal court
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, Dec. 29, 1835, art. 7, 7 Stat. 478.
Treaty with the Delaware Nation, Sept. 17, 1778, art. VI, 7 Stat. 13.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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should never exercise jurisdiction which it has not been given, but it
should never refrain from exercising jurisdiction which it has been
given. If the nation were still to follow this old maxim of Chief Justice
Marshall, we would not have any abstention doctrines. But we do. We
have abandoned Chief Justice Marshall's notion that a grant of federal
court jurisdiction is mandatory. When was the first time that the Supreme
Court abandoned this notion? It certainly was not in any of those four
types of abstention cases offered by Mr. Slade. Rather, abstention
doctrines had emerged as early as the case of Ex parte Royall, 36 decided
in 1886. I suggest to my students that Ex parte Royall was our first
abstention doctrine case. Yet, notice that Ex parte Royall is not among
Mr. Slade's listed abstention doctrines. Now, those law students in the
audience who might be taking federal courts or who have taken federal
courts might wonder about Ex Parte Royall, noting that little attention
was paid to the case in your federal courts class. The reason you may
not remember the case is that it has since been codified in statute. The
current incarnation of Ex parte Royall is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)
and (c). Ex parte Royall is the original case establishing the exhaustion
requirement for the federal writ of habeas corpus. The exhaustion
doctrine for habeas corpus began as a judicially-created abstention
doctrine. It remained a judicially-created abstention doctrine until it was
codified, if memory serves me right, in the 1948 revision of Title 28. 3 7
The reason that I put Mr. Slade's listing of the abstention doctrines
back on the board is I want to explore Ex parte Royall under the
categories offered by Mr. Slade. First, what are the grounds for habeas
abstention under Ex parte Royall? Initially, under the federal writ of
habeas corpus, the cognizable claims involved challenging the jurisdiction of the state court. At the time Ex parte Royall was decided that was
precisely the function played by the federal write of habeas -contesting
the scope of state court jurisdiction under federal law. Today, to invoke
a federal writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must either challenge the
jurisdiction of the state court on federal grounds or challenge on federal
grounds the criminal procedure employed by the state courts. The
ability to attack a criminal conviction on federal constitutional
procedural grounds is a recent development and did not exist at the time
that Ex parte Royall was decided. Second, to invoke the Ex parte Royall
doctrine, did there have to be a pending case, as Mr. Slade suggests
should be necessary for National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual

36. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
37. The exhaustion rule was first codified by the Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 967 and
has since been amended several times.
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Insurance abstention? Absolutely not! Those of you who know the
habeas corpus exhaustion rule, know it does not make any difference
whether there currently is anything pending in state court. The
petitioner almost invariably must resort to the state court to exhaust any
available state court remedies. And finally, utilizing Mr. Slade's chart,
what is the applicable test for Ex parte Royall abstention? The test is
fundamentally whether the petitioner has already resorted to state court
to exhaust available state remedies or whether such resort to state court
would be totally futile? There is perhaps one other exception--double
jeopardy. In double jeopardy cases, resorting to state court to exhaust
available state remedies by completing the state criminal trial would itself
violate the federal right the petitioner is asserting. With those narrow
exceptions, there is an otherwise unflagging obligation to first resort to
state court to exhaust available state remedies. The federal courts still
regularly enforce the Ex parte Royall abstention doctrine. They just
enforce it today pursuant to a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Thus, the first thing I reject about Mr. Slade's paper is that it misses
the closest abstention analogy- Ex parte Royall. The closest analogy is
habeas corpus exhaustion and that doctrine, like National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual Insurance, represents an unflagging obligation
to exhaust available remedies in the courts of another sovereign
irrespective of whether there is a pending proceeding in the other
sovereign's courts at the time of the filing of the federal action. It is an
obligation that is rigorously enforced. I know. I litigated habeas cases
and I sometimes got thrown out of federal court on exhaustion grounds.
The habeas exhaustion doctrine is rigorously enforced no matter how
bad or corrupt one might think the state court is. And finally, the habeas
corpus exhaustion rule, like the exhaustion rule of National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual Insurance, is invoked as a matter of comity
irrespective of the existence of pending proceedings in the state courts in
order to protect and defer to the sovereignty of another forum.
The second part of Mr. Slade's paper that I want to quarrel with is
his premise that there are four rigid abstention categories. The paper
asserts that the four abstention categories he offers represent rigid,
historical formulations for abstention and one must pigeonhole a case
into one of them or abstention is unjustified. I want to submit that
abstention has always been an evolving concept. It started with a
doctrine he does not have on his chart-Ex parte Royall. Abstention
doctrines have gradually evolved and changed ever since. Indeed, if you
read the very opinion on which he relies, Colorado River Water
Conservation District, you will see that Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court suggests that at the time of that decision there were only three
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existing categories-Pullmanabstention, Burford abstention, a n d
Younger abstention. Justice Brennan specifically noted that the Colorado
River Water Conservation District case did not fit into any of the then
existing abstention doctrines. Consequently, the case created a new
abstention doctrine, which Mr. Slade labeled as Colorado River Water
Conservation District abstention. But, if the opinion in Colorado River
Water Conservation District itself indicates that the Court has authority to
create new abstention categories to satisfy comity concerns and if
abstention doctrines therefore continually evolve over time, why should
not National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual Insurance be read as
creating new categories on Mr. Slade's chart, just as Ex parte Royall
represents a different category. The Indian abstention cases therefore
represent a unique category which one need not pigeonhole into state
abstention analogies, as Mr. Slade's paper has done. Since these two
cases constitute a unique category of abstention involving Indian tribes,
there are different rules and different exceptions, including the lack of
any requirement of a pending action in tribal court.
The references in the opinions in National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual Insurance to Colorado River Water Conservation District and to
Juidice vs. Vail, 38 upon which Mr. Slade rests his argument, were cited
for very narrow propositions. Juidice v. Vail was cited solely to explain
the bad faith assertion of jurisdiction exception set forth in a footnote in
National Farmers Union, and Colorado River Water Conservation
District was cited only to establish the principle of comity and for
nothing more. The opinions in National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual Insurance did not purport to suggest that either case could be
explained based either on Juidice or ColoradoRiver Water Conservation
District. I therefore think Mr. Slade's argument makes far too much of
those passing references, ignoring the possibility, suggested by the
opinions, that the Court, instead, was creating a new and unique doctrine
about abstention in favor of tribal courts.
I also do not think these cases can be pigeonholed as Younger
abstention cases very easily, as Mr. Slade suggests. The reason is the
history and purposes of Younger abstention. The Younger doctrine
began as an abstention in favor of pending state criminal proceedings.
The doctrine then gradually evolved to encompass state civil proceedings
where there was some significant state regulatory interest. Mr. Slade's
paper has cited as paradigm Younger cases, the two most controversial of
the Younger abstention decisions, the Texaco case 39 and the Juidice v.
38. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
39. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
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Vail.40 These two cases are controversial because they represent the most
marginal applications of the Younger abstention. Commentators have
criticized both these cases, claiming that they involved no state
regulatory interests, as had the prior Younger abstention cases. Rather,
both cases seemingly involved only private litigation. Treating National
Farmers Union as a Younger case represents one step further removed
because the facts of National Farmers Union are neither about sovereign
regulatory interests nor about state interests in any way. The case
involves a classic private tort suit. And as a consequence, even Mr.
Slade's argument extends Younger.
There are two other specific aspects of the paper I want to very
quickly call to your attention because I disagree with both of them. On
page 27 of the manuscript Mr. Slade suggests that non-Indians'
experience with tribal courts and tribal government is a recent phenomenon. I want to remind Mr. Slade that Reverands Worcester and Butler
involved in Worcester v. Georgia4 1 were not Indians. Worcester and
Butler were non-Indians and the decision of the Supreme Court in
Worcester recognized and vindicated the exclusivity of tribal processes
over even non-Indians in Indian country. I also want to remind Mr.
Slade that during the late nineteenth century, the so-called Five Civilized
Tribes (Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole) had
operating courts that regularly entertained cases involving non-Indians.
Many of these cases are referenced in the Eighth Circuit opinions of the
time. In short, tribal court involvement with non-Indians is not a recent
phenomena, as Mr. Slade suggests. George Santyana once said, "Those
who do not remember history are condemned to repeat it." I would
suggest this is a worthwhile adage to remember here.
At page 28 of the manuscript, Mr. Slade suggests that Williams vs.
Lee 42 is not a territorial jurisdiction case. If one carefully examines
Justice Black's opinion in Williams vs. Lee, you will find considerable
focus on the 1868 Treaty with the Navajo and its establishment of
exclusive tribal territorial control over the reservation. Indeed, since
Williams v. Lee involved a non-Indian trader, the case seems to me to
stand for the proposition that tribal territorial jurisdiction over civil cases
involving non-Indians arising in Indian country is presumed in the
absence of some express federal statutory or treaty limitation on tribal
authority. As a result, I think that this particular aspect of the paper is
simply wrong, as well as another reference on page 28 that suggests

40. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
41. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1831).
42. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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Williams vs. Lee invested tribes with new jurisdiction. This comment
turns federal Indian law on its head. Tribes are presumed to have
inherent sovereign power, except to the extent limited by express or
implied federal limitations. Tribes are not granted their authority from
the federal government, as Mr. Slade's reference suggests. This doctrine
was most recently reaffirmed in Wheeler v. United States.4 3
The last point I want to make involves my disagreement not with
Mr. Slade's paper but with Laurie Reynolds' excellent and wellresearched article. Specifically, I want to address the point she makes
about the connection of the Brendale case 4 4 and other like civil
regulatory or taxing jurisdiction cases to NationaiFarmers Union. She
argues that there ought to be federal jurisdiction without the need for
exhaustion in cases, such as Brendale, that contest tribal regulatory or
taxing, rather than adjudicatory, authority.. Her argument is based on
two points. First, the Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction in cases like
Brendale and Bourland4 5 without ever raising any National Farmers
Union objection. Second, she argues that, unlike cases involving the
scope of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction, cases attacking tribal regulatory
jurisdiction present pure questions of federal law involving no need for
tribal fact-finding, no special tribal interests, and no need to interpret
tribal law. I want to disagree with this argument on three levels. First,
some of the cases on which she relies, such as Brendale, were initiated in
federal court by the tribe, which clearly has the power to waive the
primacy of its own courts over the question of the scope of its jurisdiction. Second, National Farmers Union suggests both that the federal
courts need the tribal court's expertise on the meaning of tribal law and
that the federal courts will benefit from the tribal court's articulation of
the tribal interests that are involved in the reservation setting. For both
purposes, the tribal courts are more expert in ferreting out important
questions that must be resolved in order to decide whether and how to
address the federal law questions surrounding the scope of tribal court
jurisdiction. I would submit that in tribal regulatory or taxing questions
there often are preliminary questions of tribal law that must be resolved
before reaching the federal law issues. There are questions of tribal
constitutional law and sometimes questions of the interpretation of tribal
ordinances that must be resolved before reaching the federal legal issues.
Often such questions are not purely questions of federal law, as Professor
Reynolds suggests. Finally, even if no tribal law questions need be

43. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
44. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
45. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S.Ct. 2309 (1993).
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resolved in a particular case contesting the tribe's regulatory or taxing
power, the federal court will still benefit from a preliminary tribal court
articulation of any tribal interests in and the tribal setting for any
question of tribal regulatory or taxing jurisdiction. I therefore resist
Professor Reynold's notion that federal cases attacking tribal regulatory
or taxing jurisdiction involve pure questions of federal law in which
exhaustion of tribal remedies should not be required.
One last quick point since I have already overstayed my welcome.
Mr. Slade's paper has caught me in a potential interesting inconsistency,
as Professor Kevin Worthen of Brigham Young University Law School
already had done in a very interesting article. 4 6 The potential inconsistency arose on account of the different hats I wear, one as as a writer and
teacher of Indian law and another as a scholar in the federal courts area.
I have written a couple of articles on the constitutionally mandatory
nature of federal jurisdiction. Citing one of my federal court's articles,
Mr. Slade's manuscript suggests that there must be a federal forum
available somewhere for an attack on tribal court jurisdiction. It is a
mandatory federal jurisdiction argument and I must confess that, yes, I
have offered such an analysis of federal jurisdiction. This observation is
one that Kevin Worthen made some time ago, and Mr. Slade might want
to cite Professor Worthen's article in his paper. Professor Worthen noted
the seeming inconsistency between my mandatory jurisdiction position
and the results in Martinez and National Farmers Union, which, as I have
already suggested, I support. Ever since Professor Worthen pointed out
this seeming inconsistency in my own scholarship, I have pondered
whether I am somehow intellectually schizophrenic or, at least,
inconsistent. How could I resolve this seeming inconsistency? Let me
quickly, very quickly, suggest how I would harmonize my positions.
First, as I have already suggested, conciuding that the attack on the scope
of tribal court jurisdiction involved in National Farmers Union
constitutes a justiciable federal question represents a considerable,
unjustified expansion of federal question jurisdiction. I began by
suggesting that this point was the basis of some of my criticism of
National Farmers Union. At least in the case of the federal writ of
habeas corpus and my example of Ex parte Royall, there is a federal
statutory cause of action that overrides the finality of the state criminal
proceeding. No such federal statute supports the National Farmers
Union decision to create a federal cause of action or to ignore the
finality of a tribal court decision. As Mr. Lear has suggested, the
46. Kevin J. Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law Perspective
on Congressional Authority to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction,75 MINN. L. REv. 65 (1990).
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relationship between the tribal governments and the federal government
constitutes a political relationship. Because it is a political relationship,
unless Congress wants it adjudicated in federal court and has clearly so
indicated by statute, it should not be adjudicated in federal court. if the
relationship should not be adjudicated, it is not a federal question for
federal courts. Consequently, for me there is no inconsistency. But
maybe you will not buy this explanation because, notwithstanding my
criticisms of National Farmers Union, the federal courts have been
abjudicating such issues of the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction like
crazy. If one does not accept that argument, I resort ultimately to a
suggestion that Laurie Reynolds makes in her article. I do not think
reviewing final judgments of tribal courts in a separate federal proceeding can be sustained because I do believe in full faith and-credit. The
federal court has a federal statutory obligation under the Full Faith and
Credit Act to accord full faith and credit, and therefore finality, to any
final tribal court judgment adjudicating the scope of tribal court
jurisdiction. I should note that I do not think the same problems are
caused by the assertion in the United States Supreme Court of certiorari
review jurisdiction from tribal courts on federal questions if such
jurisdiction were supported by federal statute, which it currently is not. .1
previously have suggested that while I did not think that such certiorari
review was necessary, it nevertheless does not constitute as great an
intrusion on tribal sovereignty as federal district court review. I would
be the first to concede that my statement about the lack of need for such
review is somewhat inconsistent with my writings about mandatory
federal jurisdiction. But I guess I resort to the old adage that "foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds." Thank you.
MS. ALLEVA: Thank you, Bob. We extend apologies to Professor
Laurence and to the audience for our going over time, but if you have
the fortitude and the interest, please hang on for Frank Pommersheim.
MR. POMMERSHEIM: I just want to make a few overview points
and then talk about one doctrine in particular. First, just a historical note
to keep in mind that prior to National Farmers Union4 7 and Iowa
Mutual4 8 and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,4 9 there was very little
litigation in tribal courts. The federal courts and federal people in
general had no interest in what was happening in tribal courts. And so
you have the notion only when tribal courts get a certain amount of
affirmative authority and they start to exercise that authority do federal

47. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
48. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
49. 436U.S. 49 (1978).
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courts, do practitioners, does Congress really get interested in what tribes
are doing. And I think there's a certain irony that the more authority
tribes seem to have in the judicial area, the more concern there is about
federal courts' oversight or supervision or Congress enacting legislation
to put the brakes on that authority. I think that's just one of the
dilemmas about tribal sovereignty. When you have it only in the abstract
and you're not exercising it, no one cares about it. But when you have it
in reality and you start to exercise it, then everyone is interested in it.
And I think that that's just the intention, perhaps it's ironic as well, but I
think we need to keep that in mind.
Second, one of the things that is being played out, and maybe
scholars have a different view or different dilemma than practitioners, is
that one of the things that's happening is that perhaps slowly but surely,
or perhaps not slowly or perhaps not even surely, is the issue about what
ultimately is the relationship of tribal courts to federal courts? We don't
know. I don't think we know and neither does the Supreme Court.
They didn't articulate that relationship in National Farmers Union and
Iowa Mutual, and I think that's one of the incredible developmental
issues that is being played out as we speak. What is or ought to be the
relationship of tribal courts to the federal system? As Professor Clinton
has suggested in the context of federal and state courts and federal and
state government, in general you have a Tenth Amendment to create a
constitutional marker for talking about the relationship. But when
you're talking about the relationship of tribal courts to federal courts, of
tribal government to federal government, you don't have the Tenth
Amendment to act as a constitutional benchmark. Maybe, as I suggest,
some of our treaties ought to be a kind of constitutional benchmark for
orienting discussion between the federal government and tribal
government and federal courts and tribal courts.
The last thing that I want to mention before giving a particular
example is what Justice Marshall mentioned in one of his leading
opinions, where he said, this is a paraphrase, that the federal government
has always supported the development of tribal courts. Now, if that's a
true statement, that leads to interesting possibilities. What does it mean
for the tribal judiciary, for the Supreme Court in particular, to support
the development of tribal courts? What kind of development are we
talking about? Does that involve deference? Does that involve review?
Exactly what is meant by that statement of the federal courts and the
federal government always supporting the development of tribal courts?
Again, we don't know. And I think one of the things that is happening
in this area is that a lot is happening, but we really don't know in what
direction it is going. We are in the process both as practitioners and
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scholars of trying to figure it out, but I think incredibly large issues
relevant to the tribal-federal court relationship are taking place at the
same time that these individual cases are being adjudicated both in tribal
court and federal court.
Lastly, I think that the tension between the practitioners and the
scholars resides in part in the nature of being a practitioner. I think that
you want to maximize your options-you want to win. A part of
winning is maximizing your options. So if you're going to litigate or
potentially have to litigate in tribal court, I think any practitioner, most
practitioners also want the option of forum selection. For whatever
reasons they often don't want to go to tribal court, they want some
options. And so when they see the options in the abstention doctrine
and in the diversity doctrine, to take two examples, I think most
practitioners want to have those options. I want to suggest where one of
those options really doesn't apply, and that's the notion of diversity
jurisdiction.
I think diversity jurisdiction is totally inapplicable in context of
tribal court litigation. I suggest that for the following reasons: First, is
just a historical reason; that when diversity jurisdiction was established, it
was basically to avoid perceptions of unfairness in State Courts. And I
don't think you can just sort of leapfrog that concern and say that it
ought to apply in a reservation context where one of those litigants, one
of the parties, would be on the reservation and one would be a resident
and a citizen of another state. I think historically it just doesn't work.
Second, if you're trying to argue that in the context of diversity
jurisdiction in a tribal situation that you would actually apply state law. I
think that is totally impossible because one of the premises of diversity
jurisdiction is that there is subject matter jurisdiction for the State Court
in the first instance. And in the context of a cause of action arising on a
reservation there is no state subject matter jurisdiction. So if you try to
argue in the context of diversity that a federal court will be applying
state law to a transaction that took place on the reservation, I don't think
it works. It can't work. Third, I think it creates the problem of
discrimination because you would have a third category or a possible
litigant in a diversity action that arose completely on a reservation that
wouldn't be protected. If the notion of having diversity jurisdiction is to
protect against the possible unfairness of the tribal forum against
outsiders, nonresidents of that particular state would have access to the
federal court because they would have diversity. But what about a
nonreservation in-state resident who isn't a resident of the reservation
and, therefore, arguably if you're using that analogy should have the
opportunity of a different forum but if he or she simply resides off the
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reservation but not outside the state, they wouldn't have access to
diversity jurisdiction. And they would be, in a sense, stuck and
discriminated against because if you simply reside outside the state, you
would have access to diversity jurisdiction, but if you live in the state but
off the reservation, you wouldn't have access to that possibility.
Now one other possibility is if you can conceive of diversity
jurisdiction in the context of yes, you can have diversity jurisdiction in
the context of an action that arises on the reservation in which there is
concurrent jurisdiction in tribal court but the federal court would not
think about applying state law. They would have to apply tribal law.
And I don't know if people when they think about diversity jurisdiction
ever conceive of diversity jurisdiction in that particular context that,
okay, maybe you could have diversity jurisdiction but the federal court
would not be applying state law. They would be applying tribal law.
And I think that's an interesting possibility, but one problem with that is
that in most cases if you apply that notion, the federal court would have
an awfully difficult time ferreting out what tribal law is on a particular
issue because most tribal courts in terms of their decisional law and even
their statutory law are at a very early stage. A good number of cases that
are currently being litigated in tribal courts are cases of first impression.
And so to me it wouldn't even work practically because in many cases
what the federal court would probably have to try to do is certify the
questions back to the tribal court to get the tribal court to decide what, in
fact, the tribal rule was. So I think if you're going to have diversity at
all, it can only be in the context that the federal court has to apply tribal
law. And I think this stage in the development of tribal courts it's not a
very practical solution. And to me, that's just a quick overview of
diversity jurisdiction, which all practitioners know about, and all of a
sudden they're confronted with the new situation dealing with tribal
court. One of the logical reactions is, well, we want to have diversity in
our arsenal as well, but I think upon close scrutiny diversity isn't really
appropriate in the tribal court context and even though that cuts down
on the options that are available to litigants, I simply think that it isn't
available.
Again, I want to thank people for coming.
Since Sam was getting bashed so heavily by Phil, I'll offer Sam a
compliment. I really appreciate the way that people were brought
together in terms of the various sessions. I think it's very helpful for
those of us that write and do other things in the field to meet and hear
the arguments of scholars who have somewhat different views, and
particularly practitioners who I think sometimes really don't care for us
scholars because they have the notion of us just being squirreled away in
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our offices writing things. We don't actually have to be out there
litigating and worrying about the nitty-gritty on the ground kind of
stuff. So I appreciate the views of the people who are actually out there
practicing. Thank you.
MR. SLADE: I wish I could think of something I disagreed with
that's been said. You know, I can't. I think I want to start with
responding to Professor Skibine's comment that he's uncomfortable
with Colorado River. He thinks it's going to keep all cases in federal
court, which ties in in my mind to Professor Clinton's question, why not
a sixth category of abstention? And I think the answer is, to Professor
Clinton first, is we don't need one and it's not indicated in Iowa Mutual
and National Farmers Union. And to the two of them, Colorado River,
where it applies, contains all the elasticity that's necessary to address the
considerations that Professor Clinton mentioned and that the other
speakers have addressed. What are they? Federal policy interests, which
includes everything that's discussed in Iowa Mutual and National
Farmers Union. Those are important policy interests. And I'm not
arguing that they're not. Second, judicial economy; and, third, the
interests of the parties in a speedy, efficient, and reasonable dispute
resolution. No sixth category is necessary. And, by the way, there's
nothing special about habeas corpus. There are lots of other statutory
kinds of abstention like the Tax Injunction Act and the Anti-Injunction
Act that I didn't list on the board that exist in the state court situation,
federal versus state, that don't exist in the tribal situation and that will
have to be addressed. And it's one of the reasons the tax cases are
presenting so much difficulty in the Indian area.
Second, what about the question of federal question jurisdiction and
Santa Clara? Santa Clara does not hold that there's no federal question
jurisdiction with respect to jurisdictional issues arising in Indian country.
It finds no implied right of action under the Indian Civil Rights Act for a
cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of 25 U.S.C. section
1302. That's a simple, straightforward implied right of action as
Professor Clinton suggests, but it has been very clear from the Oneida
cases and others that a federal question is presented with respect to
private property rights and the exercise of federal power over nonIndians. And that, it's clear, is a federal question. If all of those federal
questions are to go through tribal court without, and we've heard
suggestion today there should be no refute of that decision by a federal
court, then I seriously question whether Professor Clinton can squarethe
idea of a mandatory federal jurisdiction of Article 3, Section 2's
language that the federal judicial power shall extend to all cases in law
and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States
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with a doctrine that there should be mandatory abstention in the kinds of
cases we're talking about. The federal court has to get a look at those
somewhere, and the only place that can happen now is in the federal
court under existing statutes.
And, finally, I agree with Professor Pommersheim that we're not
talking about what law is to be applied in the federal court. And that's
why Iowa Mutual is right about diversity jurisdiction. Maybe it's state
law. Maybe it's tribal law. And if the notion is that it's impossible for a
federal court to figure out tribal law, well, how fair is it to expect a
non-Indian litigant to go into tribal court and litigate over that law?
Clearly the federal court can be apprised of the contents of tribal law if
that's to be the rule of decision, and in many of these cases I submit it
should be, and those issues resolved there. The other thing I want to say
is I want to congratulate Angie Elsperger and the editorial staff of the
North Dakota Law Review on perhaps the best put together conference
in terms of getting together a great selection of speakers, providing
outstanding support in every stage in the process, and making it a truly
enjoyable and rewarding experience for all of us. Thank you.

